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Abstract 
In recent years social psychologists have displayed a growing interest in examining 
morality – what people consider right and wrong. The majority of work in this area has 
addressed this either in terms of individual-level processes (relating to moral decision making 
or interpersonal impression formation) or as a way to explain intergroup relations (perceived 
fairness of status differences, responses to group-level moral transgressions). We complement 
this work by examining how moral standards and moral judgements play a role in the 
regulation of individual behaviour within groups and social systems. In doing this we take 
into account processes of social identification and self-categorization, as these help 
understand how adherence to moral standards may be functional as a way to improve group-
level conceptions of self. We review a recent research program in which we have investigated 
the importance of morality for group-based identities and intra-group behavioural regulation. 
This reveals convergent evidence of the centrality of moral judgments for people’s 
conceptions of the groups they belong to, and demonstrates the importance of group-specific 
moral norms in identifying behaviours that contribute to their identity as group members. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
Morality refers to “principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or 
good and bad behaviour” (Oxford American dictionary). On the one hand, this explains the 
importance of morality in guiding individual behaviour (Beauchamp, 2001), in particular in 
communities of people living together in groups (Gert, 1988). On the other hand, it has been 
noted that shared ideas about what is the “right” way to behave may vary, depending on the 
cultural, religious, or political context in which this is defined (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Haidt 
& Graham, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011). When people agree about the “supremely important” 
goals and values that characterize their group or community (Giner-Sorolla, 2012), these may 
come to function as a moral standard that is used to define whether an individual can be 
considered a virtuous and “proper” group member (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). Even though 
such analyses suggest that intra-group dynamics and the desire to establish a distinct group 
identity are highly relevant to understand the implications of morality for the regulation of 
individual behaviour, this context has not been systematically taken into account in research 
on morality.  
Extant work on moral psychology has mainly addressed individual-level moral 
decision making (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965; Schwartz, 1970; see also, Turiel, 1983; 
2006), or has identified the implications of group-level moral transgressions (e.g., Čehajić-
Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010; 
Tarrant, Branscombe, Warner, & Weston, 2012). In this review we examine how intra-group 
moral judgments impact upon people’s social identities and behavioural coordination in 
groups (see also Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012). This is different from current approaches 
aiming to identify moral values that are universal across groups and cultures (such as 
fairness, or harm/care; Haidt, 2001). We complement existing insights by focusing on how 
moral behaviour in groups can be explained by self-
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processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1991). In doing this, we explicitly take into 
account the possibility that moral values that are shared by members of a particular group 
may be context-dependent and group-specific. Thus, instead of considering how generic 
moral guidelines and moral judgments (e.g., fairness, empathy, altruism) may help suppress 
selfish and/or aggressive behaviour (e.g., Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), we introduce a group-
level analysis to address the group-dynamic function of shared moral values. In this 
contribution we review a program of research that examines how adherence to the moral 
standards of the group can help achieve or maintain a positive group-level conception of self 
(see also Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012; Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, forthcoming; Pagliaro, 
2012). 
We propose that our analysis may help understand why people adhere to shared moral 
norms, even when these prescribe behaviours members of other groups may consider 
immoral (see also Giner-Sorolla, 2012). We demonstrate that group-specific moral norms 
impact upon behavioural choices of individual group members, regardless of the content 
(e.g., the individualistic vs. collectivistic nature) of the behaviour prescribed. We also show 
that moral guidelines provided by members of another group fail to have similar effects, 
because people consider moral judgments of outgroup members less relevant to their social 
identity.  
 This contribution is structured as follows: first, we explain our group-level approach 
to morality, in which we consider the different functions shared moral values may have for 
the way people define and maintain a positive and distinct social identity. We note how this 
differs from work that examines the impact of specific moral concerns on individual moral 
decision making, and explain how our reasoning builds on and extends research that 
illustrates the social implications of moral trait evaluations in individual impression 
formation. We then review a recent program of research that specifically addresses the role of 
social identity and self-categorization processes and the way these are relevant to moral 
Morality and Groups  
 
5
 
concerns within groups, by examining the social functions of shared moral values and moral 
evaluations in regulating the behaviour of individuals in group contexts. 
 
2. THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF MORALITY 
Morality refers to standards of human virtue (Brandt & Reyna, 2011), that direct 
people's actions (Beauchamp, 2001). Moral standards help coordinate social interactions in 
communities of people living together, for instance by suppressing selfish or aggressive 
behaviour (De Waal, 1996; Rai & Fiske, 2011). However, what people consider morally 
"good" (see also Giner-Sorolla, 2012) may differ between groups and cultures (Sachdeva, 
Singh, & Medin, 2011). Indeed, group-specific moral standards can be used to judge whether 
the individual is a “proper” and good group member (Gert, 1988; Lind & Tyler, 1988), with 
social exclusion being the ultimate consequence for those who do not behave in line with 
group morals (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). In a recent analysis, Ellemers and Van den Bos 
(2012) elaborated on this possibility, and noted that identifying what is “right” or “wrong” 
can serve various social regulatory functions, which play a role at different levels of analysis. 
In addition to seeing moral goals and values as providing a guideline for the resolution of 
intra-personal moral dilemmas, Ellemers and Van den Bos (2012) thus explore the role of 
moral judgments in interpersonal, group-level and intergroup processes, to argue that shared 
moral standards can be part of people’s social identities. This helps individuals define who 
they are and where they belong, by providing them with self-relevant behavioural guidelines 
they can use to express a distinct and specific group-based identity.   
In line with this analysis, we approach morality from a social identity and self-
categorization perspective (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1997; Turner, 1987; see also 
Ellemers & Haslam, 2011). This allows us to consider moral guidelines and moral 
transgressions in relation to group-level conceptions of self, group-based behavioral 
guidelines, and intra-group respect. A social identity perspective helps us to understand the 
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role of morality in the value people attach to the groups they belong to, and the importance of 
moral judgments in establishing a distinct group identity (Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012). 
This also elucidates that individual behavioural choices are made in the context of moral 
goals shared by self-relevant social groups. Evolutionary accounts of morality consider the 
necessity for cooperation in groups as the primary origin for the development of moral 
guidelines (see Tomasello & Vaish, 2013, for an overview). Such accounts see empathy, 
altruism, and cooperation in social communities as key indicators of moral behaviour that 
explain why appeals to moral values benefit society. However, such analyses of universal 
moral values cannot explain moral value conflicts between different groups in society, nor do 
they help understand why what some consider “immoral” behaviour (e.g., euthanasia, 
abortion, the use of firearms) can be seen as “moral” by members of other political, religious, 
or ethnic groups (Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
The notion that shared moral values may function to define a distinct social identity 
thus fundamentally differs from approaches that consider morality as a generic guideline that 
helps suppress selfish or aggressive behaviour (Haidt, 2008). When members of a particular 
social group agree upon specific moral standards, this provides them with a definition of what 
is considered right and wrong within their group—which is not necessarily shared with other 
groups. To the extent that individual group members behave in line with these moral 
guidelines, they can anticipate being respected as “good” group members. The social identity 
approach explicitly takes into account the possibility that people try to differentiate their 
group from relevant other groups. As a result, different behaviours, values, or goals may be 
seen to characterize one’s group, depending on whether and how these may contribute to the 
group’s distinct identity. Indeed, in principle, even negatively valenced group characteristics 
may fulfill the aim of establishing a distinct group identity (Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). This 
perspective allows us to understand that shared goals or values that characterize the group 
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may come to be seen as the only “right” way for group members to behave, thus elevating 
them to the level of group morals.  
 Thus, against the background of generic moral concerns (e.g., harm/care) that may 
shape personal values, beliefs and preferences, the awareness of specific moral values and 
guidelines that are characteristic for one’s group also tend to impact on what people consider 
the “right” way to behave. The importance of other people’s (anticipated) judgments in moral 
behaviour has been considered before (see for instance research on consumer intentions to 
protest against retail organizations; e.g., Cronin, Reysen, & Branscombe, 2012). For example, 
it has been argued that what is generally considered as a personal belief about the moral 
nature of a specific behaviour can be based on what others around us regard as moral (e.g., 
Manstead, 2000). Likewise, Batson (2008; see also Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, 
Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, 
Whitney, & Strongman, 1999) has noted that the behavioural choices people make in moral 
dilemmas do not necessarily reflect their own preferences, but are also determined by the 
concern of appearing moral in the eyes of others. Batson and colleagues refer to this 
phenomenon as indicating “moral hypocrisy”, and contrast this with  the tendency to behave 
in line with one’s own moral principles which they designated as “moral integrity” (Batson, 
2008). 
Our current analysis builds on these insights, but it differs from these prior approaches 
in two ways. First, we consider both personal beliefs and social norms as relevant concerns in 
determining moral behaviour. That is, we explicitly address how group-specific moral norms 
impact upon personal preferences held by individual group members to determine their 
behavioural choices. Second, we specify the nature of the ‘others’ whose moral judgment is 
anticipated. That is, we argue for the role of those who share the same group identity (rather 
than outgroup members) as defining what is moral, and thus also as relevant judges of the 
morality of one’s actions. Thus, we focus on group-specific moral norms as these prescribe 
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how “a good group member” should behave. In the next section we will elaborate on the 
importance of intra-group evaluations of moral behaviour, by considering empirical evidence 
that illustrates the impact of moral concerns and moral evaluations in social judgments.  
2.1 The importance of morality in social judgments  
There is a long-standing tradition in psychology to address individual differences in 
the tendency to cooperate, show empathy, behave fairly, and to adhere to or deviate from 
social norms (see also Haidt, 2001; Turiel, 1983), even if these are not always explicitly 
referred to as indicating differences in “morality” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). The way people 
tend to behave towards others is considered a very basic dimension of social judgment that is 
highly relevant to impression formation of individuals as well as of groups (e.g., De Bruin & 
Van Lange, 1999; 2000; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; 
Martijn, Spears, van der Pligt, & Jakobs,1992; Phalet & Poppe, 1997; Vonk, 1996; 
Wojciszke, 2005). Some of this work organizes the traits that people tend to ascribe to 
themselves and others into two broad clusters, usually referred to as warmth and competence 
(e.g., Cuddy et al., 2008). More recent empirical evidence suggests that the broad cluster of 
interpersonal behaviours subsumed under the label “warmth” actually encompasses two 
separate and more specific dimensions, distinguishing between morality and sociability 
(Leach et al., 2007; see below for more details). While sociability refers to a target’s ability 
or intention to form social connections with others (e.g., friendliness), morality speaks to the 
perceived correctness or (contextual) appropriateness of social behaviour (e.g., 
trustworthiness), that is relevant to our current analysis. 
Several studies suggest that people respond more immediately and spontaneously to 
social information indicating morality rather than competence or sociability. For instance, 
less time is required to detect trustworthiness in a face than to detect competence or 
sociability (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Furthermore, evidence from a memory confusion 
paradigm revealed that same sex individuals were spontaneously categorized on the basis of 
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positive or negative information about their moral behaviour, rather than their competence 
(Van Leeuwen, Park, & Penton-Voak, 2012). Self-reports also indicate that in social 
interactions people primarily express an interest in understanding whether someone’s 
intentions are beneficial or harmful, rather than whether or not they are competent in enacting 
those intentions (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2008). 
The great importance people attach to morality in social interactions also emerges 
from work examining whether and how information about specific behaviours impacts upon 
broader trait inferences. That is, so-called negativity effects—in which observers place 
greater weight on negative than positive information when forming an impression of others—
are particularly pronounced for behaviours relevant to morality. As a result, a single instance 
of dishonest behaviour can spoil previous expectations of honesty. By contrast, a single 
instance of honest behaviour is not sufficient to overcome or repair an expectation of 
dishonesty (Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Reeder & Brewer, 1979). More generally, behaviours 
indicating (the absence of) morality are thought to be asymmetrically related to trait 
inferences, with negatively valenced behaviours having a larger impact than positive moral 
behaviours (Reeder, Pryor, & Wojciszke, 1992; Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999). In line with 
this reasoning, Skowronski and Carlston (1987) demonstrated that dishonest behaviours are 
more predictive of perceived immorality than honest behaviours are seen as diagnostic of 
morality. This is the case because people anticipate that moral individuals would never be 
dishonest, while immoral individuals may sometimes display honest behaviour (see also 
Rothbart & Park, 1986).  
Thus, a substantial amount of research (e.g., De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999; 2000; 
Martijn et al., 1992; Vonk, 1996; Wojciszke, 2005; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998) 
attests to the importance people attach to information conveying the moral implications of 
people’s behaviours, rather than their competence. Morality dominates impression formation, 
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even in situations where competence would appear to be highly relevant, such as when the 
ultimate goal is to achieve optimal task performance.  
It is important to note that in some of this research this was examined by contrasting 
competence information with information implying people’s broader social intentions, 
encompassing traits indicating morality (e.g., honesty, sincerity) as well as sociability (e.g., 
helpful, good-natured). Nevertheless, a series of studies by Leach et al. (2007) demonstrated 
that judgments of morality and sociability emerge as theoretically and empirically distinct 
dimensions in positive evaluations of the ingroup. Taking into account this more precise 
distinction between morality, sociability, and competence proposed by Leach et al. (2007), 
Brambilla and colleagues examined the way people form impressions about other individuals 
(Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011) and groups (Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, 
Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012) based on trait information indicating morality vs. sociability or 
competence. In this research morality and sociability consistently emerged as conceptually 
distinct dimensions in the evaluation of social behaviours (see also Anderson & Sedikides, 
1991; Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999). Additionally, this research revealed that individuals are 
more interested in gathering information about morality (than sociability and competence) 
when asked to form an impression about other individuals or groups (Brambilla et al., 2011; 
2012). 
To examine the further implications of such impression formation, a recent study 
examined people’s behavioural intentions towards a newcomer at work, depending on the 
information they had received about the morality and competence of this individual (Pagliaro, 
Brambilla, Sacchi, D’Angelo, & Ellemers, in press). Seventy-nine employees of primary 
schools (teachers and administrative staff) received a table, allegedly reporting a description 
of the characteristics of a prospective school manager. Specifically, following the procedure 
developed by Brambilla and colleagues (2011; 2012), employees received a short page in 
which the prospective school manager was described in terms of six characteristics, three 
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referring to morality and three indicating competence. The trait information participants 
received in this way characterized the new manager as being high vs. low in morality (e.g., 
honesty, sincerity) and high vs. low in competence (e.g., intelligence, skilfulness). The school 
employees in this study reported a more positive emotional response towards the prospective 
new manager who was described as a moral (vs. immoral) person (see Table 1). As a result, 
employees also indicated a greater willingness to engage in discretionary behaviours 
favouring the new school manager (e.g., spend time to show him/her the city) when they 
thought this individual was moral rather than immoral. By contrast, information indicating 
the (lack of) competence of the prospective new school manager impacted less strongly upon 
the emotional responses reported by school employees. More importantly, their intentions to 
behave in ways that might benefit the new manager were not affected by information 
indicating competence or lack thereof. 
Similar results were obtained by Barreto, Haslam, and Kerridge (2012) who examined 
the impressions participants formed of an ingroup leader. Participants read about an ingroup 
leader who had reported on the ingroup’s finances in ways that were described as competent, 
incompetent, honest (moral), or dishonest (immoral), in a 2(dimension) X 2(valence) design. 
Importantly, the exact same behaviour (e.g., resulting in mistakes in the financial report) was 
described as either due to incompetence or to immorality, controlling for the content of the 
actual behaviour (within negatively and within positively valenced conditions) and its most 
immediate consequences for the group. Group members were more positive about and more 
willing to endorse an ingroup leader who was described as moral or as competent, than a 
leader who was described as immoral or as incompetent, showing an unsurprising effect of 
valence. Importantly, however, leadership endorsement was significantly more affected by 
information about the leader’s morality than by information about the leader’s competence. 
As a result, participants were significantly less likely to be positive about and to endorse the 
immoral leader than the incompetent leader.  
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In sum, different strands of research convey the profound implications of traits and 
behaviours that indicate morality in social impression formation. We propose that the 
predominance of moral evaluations in the impressions people form of other individuals and 
groups also resonates in the way people think of themselves and the impression they evoke 
among others that are important to them. In the next section we therefore examine the 
implications of moral evaluations for people’s motivation to be (considered) moral by others 
– and other ingroup members in particular. 
2.2 The motivation to be (considered) moral  
Morality not only dominates the impressions people form of others around them, it 
also is a primary determinant of self-views. For instance, morality emerged as the most 
important guiding principle for individual behaviour across cultures (Schwartz, 1992). 
Likewise, Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, and Fischer (2002), examining samples in 
different cultural groups, consistently found that individuals who were asked to report how 
they would feel if they were thought to be dishonest or untrustworthy (vs. honest or 
trustworthy) were more likely to report negative feelings about themselves (see also the 
holier than thou effect; Epley & Dunning, 2000). A similar conclusion may be drawn from 
Monin and Jordan’s (2009) work on moral self-regard - that part of the self-concept that 
indicates the extent to which people think of themselves as a moral person in a particular 
situation.  
Because of the importance people attach to moral goals and moral self-views, and the 
severe and far-reaching implications of being seen to act immorally, people are highly 
concerned when their moral values are called into question by others who are important to 
them, and are extremely motivated to behave in ways that help them appear as being moral in 
the eyes of these others. This was demonstrated, for instance, in a series of studies in which 
research participants were asked to reach a joint decision with a team mate who indicated 
disagreement with their moral values (vs. someone who held opposing material interests). 
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Results of these studies revealed that within-team disagreement about moral values (rather 
than interests) was more likely to impact upon people’s sense of self and identity 
(Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harinck, & Scheepers, 2012). Accordingly, cardiovascular indicators 
showed that moral value disagreements within the team induced a negative physiological 
state suggestive of threat – indicating the perceived inability to cope with the situation. By 
contrast, within-team disagreement about material interests raised a positive state of 
challenge – a cardio-vascular response pattern indicating that the body mobilizes energy to 
address the situation (Kouzakova, Harinck, Ellemers, & Scheepers, under review). 
Additional evidence that people are motivated to behave in ways that their group 
considers moral was obtained in a series of studies that examined implications of having an 
ingroup representative frame the achievement of equal employment opportunities for ethnic 
minorities in the Netherlands as a moral ideal (instead of an obligation). Results revealed that 
white student participants or white employees who were asked by an ingroup representative 
to consider the achievement of equal opportunities as a moral ideal were more successful in 
generating ideas about what they might do to achieve this ideal, and were more inclined to 
endorse affirmative action measures (Does, Derks, & Ellemers, 2011). Additionally, 
contemplating ways in which they might contribute to achieving the moral ideal of equal 
employment opportunities raised a cardiovascular response pattern indicative of a positive 
state of challenge, rather than a negative state of threat (Does, Derks, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 
2012). 
The motivation to be considered a moral group member was also examined in a series 
of studies in which an Implicit Association Test (associating pictures of women with or 
without a headscarf with positive and negative pictures) was presented to female white 
participants either as a test of moral values or as a test of the ability to combine different 
stimuli with specific key presses. Results of a first set of studies revealed that participants 
were more concerned about the social implications of their test performance when they 
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thought the test assessed their morality rather than their competence. Accordingly, research 
participants were more inclined to suppress their implicit behavioural bias against Muslim 
women on the IAT when they thought the test was diagnostic of their morality rather than 
their competence (see Table 2). In a follow-up study using the same experimental design, 
indicators of brain activity assessed with event-related electro-encephalogram measures 
(ERP’s) revealed that participants who thought of the task as a test of their morality (rather 
than their competence) showed evidence of increased attention for the task stimuli and 
greater concern about giving a correct response (Van Nunspeet, Ellemers, Derks, & 
Nieuwenhuis, in press). 
Based on this initial work, a further series of studies was conducted, to examine 
whether the tendency to suppress bias as a way to appear moral would be more pronounced 
when being evaluated by an ingroup audience, rather than an outgroup audience. This time, at 
the outset of the study participants were allegedly placed into minimal groups, based on their 
style of decision making (Van Nunspeet, Derks, Ellemers, & Nieuwenhuis, 2013). While 
working on the IAT (associating pictures of women with or without a headscarf with positive 
and negative pictures), participants received feedback from a female white confederate. This 
individual was introduced either as a minimal ingroup member or as a minimal outgroup 
member, by specifying their preferred style of decision making. After each trial of the IAT, 
participants were presented with a video still in which the confederate non-verbally indicated 
approval – smile and ‘thumbs up’ for correct responses - or disapproval – frown and ‘thumbs 
down’ for incorrect responses. Two studies using this methodology revealed converging 
results. The greater tendency to suppress implicit behavioural bias against Muslim women 
and to show increased attention and response monitoring in ERP’s when the IAT was 
presented as a test of morality (rather than competence; as in Van Nunspeet et al., in press) 
most clearly emerged when participants thought their behaviour was monitored by a minimal 
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ingroup member, rather than an outgroup member  (Van Nunspeet, Derks, Ellemers, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2013). 
In sum, results from a range of psychophysiological, self-report, and behavioural 
measures obtained in different research paradigms, all suggest that people try to behave in 
ways that make them seem moral, and suffer distress when their morality is called into 
question, especially by ingroup members (for overviews, see: Ellemers, & Van Nunspeet, in 
press; Ellemers, Van Nunspeet, & Scheepers, in press). In the next section, we will elaborate 
on the implications of the motivation to be (considered) moral for people’s group-based 
identities, as we examine the morality of one’s group as a potential source of positive 
identity.  
2.3 Morality as a source of positive identity 
 The social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) proposes that – in principle - any 
evaluative dimension can form the basis for a positive evaluation of the ingroup. Thus, much 
of the empirical work in this area has not systematically considered the nature of the 
dimension on which groups are compared as being theoretically meaningful. As a result, the 
majority of research on positive ingroup evaluations has in fact examined effects of the 
relative competence of the group - indicated for instance by the group’s performance on an 
experimental task, or the societal status of different natural groups. Only recently have 
researchers begun to explicitly address the relative importance of morality (vs. competence 
and sociability) as a source of positive ingroup identity, in order to examine the role of 
morality for the group-level self-concept (Leach et al., 2007).  
 A series of studies clearly established that evaluations of the group’s morality are 
statistically distinct from evaluations of the group’s competence as well as its sociability 
(Leach et al., 2007). That is, in four different data sets (Leach et al., 2007; Studies 1, 2a, 2b, 
and 3) exploratory as well as confirmatory factor analyses revealed that different 
characteristics that were used to evaluate the group were best represented in a three factor 
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solution. Although these factors were allowed to covary, they consistently showed only weak 
intercorrelations or cross-loadings (below .30). For further analyses, partial correlations were 
used to establish the unique relation between each of these evaluative components and other 
variables of interest. 
  In a first study, Dutch student participants were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they deemed important that the various groups to which they belong possess traits referring to 
morality, competence, and sociability. Participants indicated that they considered traits 
referring to morality (honest, sincere, trustworthy) as more important indicators of the value 
of a group they belonged to than traits indicating the group’s competence (competent, 
intelligent, skilled) or sociability (likable, warm, friendly). In a second study participants 
were assigned to experimental groups of global vs. detailed perceivers, allegedly on the basis 
of their performance on a bogus task that assessed their perception style. Then, identification 
with the ingroup was measured, participants were asked to rate the ingroup on characteristics 
relating to morality, sociability, and competence, and to provide an overall evaluation of their 
group. The results of this study revealed that the level of identification with the 
experimentally created ingroup was uniquely related to participants’ ascription of ingroup 
morality. That is, the more they thought their group was moral, the more participants were 
inclined to report that they identified with this group. The ascription of competence or 
sociability to the ingroup was not related to the level of ingroup identification participants 
reported (Leach et al., 2007; Study 2). 
 These initial studies were followed up with a set of studies examining students from 
Leiden University as a natural group. The ingroup (Leiden University students) was 
compared with an outgroup consisting of students from the University of Amsterdam (Leach 
et al., 2007, Study 3); experimental instructions framed the ingroup as relatively successful or 
unsuccessful, compared to the outgroup, on various domains allegedly valued by  prospective 
employers. Regardless of whether the ingroup was presented as relatively successful or 
Morality and Groups  
 
17
 
unsuccessful, the morality of the ingroup emerged as the most important determinant of a 
positive evaluation of the ingroup. 
 In a final set of studies (Leach et al., 2007; Studies 4 and 5) bogus information was 
provided to induce high vs. low ingroup morality (e.g., the alleged tendency of Leiden 
University students to cheat on exams), and this was crossed with information indicating high 
vs. low competence (the alleged quality of Master theses of students from Leiden University; 
Study 4) or sociability (the alleged tendency of students from Leiden University to behave in 
a friendly manner; Study 5). In both studies, pride in the ingroup only depended on the 
perceived morality of the group (see Table 3). That is, participants who thought students from 
their university were more moral than students from other universities reported more pride in 
their group membership than participants who were led to believe students at their university 
were relatively less moral. Importantly, when information about different dimensions of 
group virtue was available, the perceived morality of the ingroup impacted upon the level of 
ingroup pride reported, regardless of the information participants had received about the 
perceived competence (Study 4) or sociability (Study 5) of the ingroup. Likewise, only when 
the morality of the ingroup seemed deficient did participants distance themselves from the 
group, by emphasizing intra-group differences (Study 4) or claiming they were different from 
other group members (Study 5; see Table 3). Again, when explicit information about the 
group’s morality was available, informing participants that their group was lacking in 
competence or sociability did not contribute to the tendency to distance the self from the 
ingroup.  
 Further evidence for the link between perceptions of morality and group identity can 
be gathered from research by Barreto et al. (2012), noted above, where participants were 
asked to indicate their impressions of an ingroup leader described as competent, incompetent, 
moral, or immoral (in a 2 (dimension) X 2 (valence) design). In a series of studies, 
participants indicated that the leader described as immoral and the leader described as 
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incompetent were equally damaging to the ingroup, but they rated the immoral leader as 
significantly less prototypical of the group than the incompetent leader. A separate study 
replicated this effect and additionally showed that when no information about leader morality 
was provided, leaders who were described as prototypical of the group were seen as more 
moral than leaders who were described as atypical of the group.   
 Together, these studies demonstrate that morality is a primary source of ingroup 
virtue, and suggest that positive evaluations of a group in terms of morality can contribute 
more to a positive social identity than other dimensions of ingroup value – relating for 
instance to the group’s competence or sociability. Following the analysis proposed by 
Ellemers and Van den Bos (2012), and in view of the current goal to understand the relation 
between morality and behavioural regulation in groups, this raises the question of how the 
morality of the ingroup impacts upon emotional responses and behavioural intentions of 
individual group members 
 This question was addressed in a series of studies by Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, and 
Ellemers (in press). After pretesting stimulus materials for comparability and credibility (to 
rule out alternative explanations for effects) Italian student participants were asked to 
evaluate a target individual who was presented as an ingroup member (someone of Italian 
descent) or outgroup member (someone of Indian descent). To introduce this target 
individual, some additional information was provided in the form of a score-card, allegedly 
indicating whether the individual had scored high or low on a series of traits. In the first study 
(N = 83), participants only received information relating to the morality of the target 
individual (e.g., honesty, sincerity). In follow-up studies, additional information was provided 
to convey high vs. low competence (e.g., competence, skilfulness; Study 2; N = 165) or 
sociability (e.g., warmth, friendliness; Study 3; N = 108), in addition to information 
indicating the morality of the target individual. Subsequently, participants were asked to 
indicate whether and how (i.e., in terms of the group’s identity or the group’s safety) they felt 
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threatened by the target individual. Finally, participants were invited to indicate their 
behavioural intentions to approach (e.g., cooperate with) or avoid (e.g., distance themselves 
from) the target individual.    
 The results of all three studies showed converging results. The morality of the target 
individual significantly affected participants’ experiences of threat as well as their 
behavioural intentions (in Studies 1, 2 and 3), and no comparable effects were observed as a 
result of differences in the competence (Study 2) or sociability (Study 3) of the target. 
However, the impact of the target’s morality differed depending on whether the target 
represented an ingroup or an outgroup member. An ingroup target lacking in morality was 
experienced primarily as a threat to the image of one’s group, whereas an immoral outgroup 
target was seen to represent a threat to the safety of one’s group. Even though both ingroup 
and outgroup targets raised behavioural avoidance rather than approach intentions when 
lacking in morality, the desire to avoid the target was mediated by the experience of group 
image threat in the case of an ingroup target, and by group safety threat in the case of an 
outgroup target.  
 Prior work on the black sheep effect has also demonstrated that people tend to 
distance themselves from and exclude ingroup members who fail to meet the group’s norms 
or standards (e.g., Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). However, the studies reviewed above 
are the first to establish the specific importance of moral shortcomings (rather than a lack of 
competence or sociability) in this context. Additionally, the studies reviewed here 
demonstrate the process underlying group-members’ responses to the moral inadequacy of an 
ingroup target and clarify how this differs from their responses to an outgroup target. 
Specifically, intentions to avoid morally deficient ingroup targets are motivated by the far-
reaching implications of such shortcomings for the image of the group – not because of group 
safety concerns. Even though people are equally likely to avoid an outgroup target that is 
lacking in morality, they do so for different reasons, as group safety concerns predominate 
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and are cause for behavioural avoidance when confronted with an immoral outgroup member.  
 
 3. MORALITY AND BEHAVIOURAL REGULATION IN GROUPS 
So far we have identified the social functions of morality, and have presented 
empirical evidence to demonstrate how moral evaluations relate to people’s individual and 
group-based identities. In the remainder of this contribution we will consider the further 
implications of these processes for behavioural regulation within groups. We have noted 
above that the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) clarifies how membership in 
social groups can help individuals define who they are, where they belong, and how they 
should behave. As a consequence, social groups are likely to affect individual behaviour, not 
only because of interdependence and instrumentality concerns, but primarily for more 
abstract meaning-seeking and social-distinctiveness reasons (Turner, 1991). 
Group norms – indicating what the group considers the right and “proper” thing to do 
– constitute an important guideline for the behaviour of individual group members (Turner, 
1991). Consequently, adherence to group norms should help earn respect from other ingroup 
members, as it demonstrates one is a “good” group member, who is willing to let go of 
individual behavioural preferences in order to behave in ways that are approved by the group 
(see for instance, Barreto & Ellemers, 2000). Conversely, the transgression of moral norms 
can have severe social implications. In fact, moral norm transgression should be seen as more 
socially consequential than the transgression of competence-based norms (see also 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). In the next sections we will review research examining when 
and why this is the case, and explore whether the tendency to adhere to morality-based group 
norms actually can be explained from social identity concerns.  
3.1 Organizational ethics and employee cooperation 
 As a first illustration of the implications of moral norm adherence for behavioural 
regulation in groups, we examine organizational morality as a relevant concern in the 
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coordination of individual effort in organizational contexts. Prior efforts to examine how 
social identity concerns impact upon behaviour in organizations have revealed that the 
willingness of individual employees to cooperate with each other and to exert themselves 
towards the achievement of organizational goals depends on the extent to which they feel 
committed to their work team or organization (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Van den Heuvel, 
1998; Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Haslam & Ellemers, 2005; 2011). Prior work 
has also shown that employees who take pride in the organization report greater work 
satisfaction and organizational commitment. In fact, these relations were even observed 
among volunteer workers who are not bound to the organization by instrumental concerns or 
contractual obligations (Boezeman & Ellemers, 2007). The experimental research reviewed 
above suggests that perceiving the organization as moral may constitute an important source 
of organizational pride. As a result, organizational activities or practices that attest to the 
morality of the organization should elicit positive work attitudes that foster cooperative 
behaviour and rule compliance among employees of the organization. Thus, we reasoned that 
the ethical behaviour of the organization (rather than its financial performance or efficiency) 
contributes to perceived organizational morality and pride, which in turn raise employee 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, and compliance. The validity of this reasoning was 
tested in a series of studies among different samples of employees working in a range of 
organizations. 
 Ellemers, Kingma, Van den Burgt, and Barreto (2011) asked employees in a variety 
of work contexts to indicate their evaluations of and attitudes towards their own organization. 
This work was done in the context of a broader research tradition on organizational 
behaviour, in which a social identity approach provides added value in understanding the 
work attitudes and behaviours of individual employees (e.g., Ashfort & Mael, 1989; Haslam 
& Ellemers, 2005; Hogg & Terry 2000). Work in this research tradition tends to address work 
satisfaction and commitment to work teams and organizations as relevant outcome variables, 
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as these related to the motivated behaviour of individual employees, such as the willingness 
to engage in discretionary efforts on behalf of the work team or organization (e.g., Ellemers, 
2001; Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Haslam & Ellemers, 2005).  
 A first study (Ellemers et al., 2011, Study 1) examined the relation between perceived 
organizational morality on the one hand, and organizational commitment and work 
satisfaction on the other. Based on Tyler’s (1999) social identity model of cooperation with 
the organization, the perceived value of the organization was thought to elicit feelings of 
organizational pride, which in turn should determine the tendency of employees to report 
feelings of attachment to the organization in the form of positive job attitudes such as 
satisfaction and commitment. To assess the role of perceived organizational morality as a 
potential source of group value (Leach et al., 2007), we addressed a convenience sample 
consisting of employees in the Netherlands (N = 126), through a consultancy firm offering 
advice for organizations on possible Corporate Social Responsibility activities. Participants 
working at five different organizations were asked to indicate in an internet questionnaire to 
what extent they considered their organization to be honest, sincere, and trustworthy. 
Subsequently, they were asked whether they were proud to work for their organization, and 
indicated their level of affective organizational commitment and work satisfaction on rating 
scales. Structural equation modelling revealed that differences in perceived morality of one’s 
organization were strongly related to differences in employee’s attitudinal responses to the 
organization. That is, perceived organizational morality directly related to pride in 
organization and – through pride – showed an indirect relation with affective commitment to 
the organization and work satisfaction (see Figure 1). Alternative causal order models (e.g., 
in which employee attitudes or pride were examined as possible predictors of perceived 
organizational morality) fit the data less well. 
 A second study (Ellemers et al., 2011; Study 2) aimed to uncover potential 
antecedents of perceived organizational morality among a larger sample of workers in a 
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specific organization (N = 649). A range of organizational activities indicating Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR; Basu & Palazzo, 2008; Wood, 1991) were listed to assess the 
extent to which this organization was perceived to display ethical behaviour (e.g., by 
refraining from making false promises to customers), to be involved with the local 
community, or to show concern for the environment. Such activities have been found to 
covary with organizational attractiveness (Schmidt, Albinger, & Freeman, 2000) and 
reputation (Turban & Greening, 1997). Accordingly, Ellemers et al. (2011, Study 2) 
investigated whether perceived engagement of the organization in specific CSR activities 
induces perceptions of organizational morality and impacts upon employees’ attitudes 
relevant to work motivation. The results of this study confirmed that perceived engagement 
of the organization in CSR activities contributes to perceptions of organizational morality. In 
this context, organizational displays of ethical behaviour (e.g., towards customers) was more 
strongly related to perceived organizational morality than community involvement or 
environmental awareness. More importantly, perceived organizational morality mediated the 
effect of CSR activities on employees’ affective commitment to the organization and job 
satisfaction - work attitudes that are relevant to the discretionary motivation of employees. 
 A potential drawback of this research was that the context of CSR activities – 
conveying the interest of the researchers in organizational moral behaviour – was made 
explicit as the focus of the survey. This was not the case in another study, which was based 
on an ongoing large scale annual survey in a worldwide operating financial service 
organization (Ellemers & Boezeman, under review). Through secondary analyses of this 
survey, Ellemers and Boezeman constructed indicators of perceived competence of the 
organization (organizational performance relative to other organizations, and internal 
efficiency of the organization) as well as of the perceived morality of the organization 
(integrity of organizational practices and behaviours of others in the organization). These 
were related to measures of work satisfaction and employee compliance: the willingness of 
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individual workers to adhere to and enforce rules and regulations of the organization. 
 This analysis relied on pre-existing data that were collected by the organization to 
develop their HR policy – not for scientific research. Hence, the measures that were available 
were not ideally suited to assess the theoretical constructs or interest. Furthermore, even 
though surveys were taken at different points in time, different numbers and sub-samples of 
employees were surveyed each year, making it impossible to trace longitudinal developments 
over time. Nevertheless, the same pattern of results consistently emerged in responses from 
different samples of middle managers in this organization, even though they were working in 
a range of job types (operations, information technology, sales), in different parts of the 
world and surveyed at different points in time (Year 1: N=359; Year 2: N=4760; Year 3: 
N=7579). Across the board, perceived organizational morality had an incremental value in 
predicting pride in the organization and employee satisfaction, above and beyond the impact 
of organizational competence. Furthermore, perceived organizational morality emerged as the 
only reliable predictor of employee compliance, showing regression weights between .30 and 
.45. Here too, reverse causal modelling (in which employee satisfaction or compliance were 
examined as potential predictors of perceived organizational morality) fit the data less well. 
 Thus, the evidence for the importance of morality for people’s social identities 
extends beyond experimental findings obtained under artificially created conditions. Among 
different samples of workers working in a large variety of work contexts, perceptions of 
organizational morality were found to play a key role in predicting pride in the organization 
and organizational attachment. Moreover, activities and perceptions indicating the morality of 
the organization reliably predicted the job attitudes of individual employees relevant to work 
motivation and work performance. It is important to note that organizational morality was the 
primary predictor of employees’ job attitudes, and emerged above and beyond the effects of 
organizational competence, even in a work context where competence clearly matters.   
3.2 Group norms and behavioural choices  
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 Whereas these studies among employees in different organizations yield results in line 
with our reasoning, the data available to us were correlational, making it difficult to draw 
unambiguous conclusions about the causality of the observed relations. This is why we more 
specifically examined the impact of morality on intragroup behavioural regulation, in a series 
of experiments. In all these experiments we presented participants with relevant group norms 
conveying approval of specific behaviours. We compared the impact of the same group 
norms, depending on whether behaviour in line with these norms was said to indicate 
superior competence or morality (i.e., someone who behaves in this way is considered 
smart/moral by the group). The general aim of these studies was to examine whether the 
importance of morality for individuals’ collective self-concept also implies that they are more 
inclined to adhere to group norms when these refer to shared moral judgments. 
 A first series of studies, conducted with both artificially created and natural groups 
(Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008), examined the role of moral group norms on the 
behaviour of individual group members (in this case, the willingness to work at group – 
instead of individual – status improvement). In previous work on the influence of group 
norms on group members’ behaviour, individuals were usually led to believe that a general 
norm established which behaviour was valued by other group members (e.g., Barreto & 
Ellemers, 2000; Jetten, Postmes & McAuliffe, 2002; McAuliffe, Jetten, Hornsey, & Hogg, 
2003). This series of studies adapted the procedure employed by Barreto and Ellemers (2000) 
to manipulate group norms – i.e., providing bogus feedback on the right way to behave, 
allegedly derived from a previously interviewed sample of ingroup members – by 
additionally specifying whether the normative behaviour was seen by the group as attesting to 
the individual’s morality or to the competence of the individual. That is, a comparison was 
made between morality-based group norms – suggesting that individuals should behave in a 
given way because it is the moral thing to do – with competence-based group norms – 
suggesting that individuals should behave in a given way because it is the smart thing to do. 
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 Thus, participants were presented with group norms defined in terms of morality or 
competence considerations, to examine the differential effectiveness of these two types of 
norms, while the behaviour approved by these norms remained the same. The central 
prediction tested in this series of studies was that morality norms should have a greater 
impact on individual behavioural choices than competence norms. In this case, the focal 
behavioural choice was whether members of a low-status group decided to pursue individual 
or group status improvement, depending on the norm prescribed by other group members. 
The specific group norm was manipulated by means of bogus feedback in which the focus of 
the normative behaviour was counterbalanced. That is, participants were led to believe that 
their fellow in-group members considered individual or group status improvement as 
desirable, either because it is the moral or the competent thing to do. The primacy of morality 
over competence norms was not only investigated by assessing the extent to which people 
adapt their behaviour to these norms, but also by assessing how much time group members 
take to decide how to behave. If moral norms constitute such a powerful guideline for 
individual behaviour, then norms referring to moral judgments (rather than competence 
judgments) should more quickly and easily resolve the dilemma members of low-status 
groups face when deciding between individual and group status improvement. 
A first study in this series (Ellemers et al., 2008, Study 1, N = 89) tested participants 
in a laboratory situation, where they were working on a personal computer. Their responses 
were obtained after orthogonally manipulating whether group norms referred to competence 
or morality judgments, and whether these suggested that group or individual status 
improvement was favoured by the group.  Participants in this study were divided into groups, 
by means of a bogus “associative thinking” task (Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995; see also, 
Barreto & Ellemers, 2000). Then they performed a group task, after which low group status 
was induced based on false task performance feedback. Subsequently, participants were told 
that a second task would follow to investigate how individual and group performance could 
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be optimized. This task consisted of a series of organizational problems. However, on each 
trial participants had to decide whether they wanted to be tested individually or with their 
group. It was stressed that participants could either decide to contribute to their individual 
self-improvement (by deciding to be tested individually) or to the improvement of the group 
(by deciding to be tested as a group).  
In-group norms were induced by informing participants how their fellow in-group 
members evaluated those who pursue individual vs. group status improvement. In the 
morality norm condition, in-group members were said to evaluate one strategy of status 
improvement as more moral and the other strategy as less moral. In the competence norm 
condition, in-group members were said to evaluate one strategy of status improvement as 
more “smart” and the other as more “stupid.” Then participants’ decisions to adopt a strategy 
of (individual vs. group) status improvement were assessed, and the decision latencies were 
monitored to be able to examine the time needed to decide whether or not follow the group 
norm.   
Results of this first study revealed that participants were more likely to go along with 
the norm to pursue group status improvement when this norm was described in terms of 
morality rather than competence (see Table 4). The greater impact of morality rather than 
competence norms was also evident from participants’ response latencies. As hypothesised 
participants took less time to decide on a strategy of status improvement when this was 
advocated by a morality norm rather than a competence norm. They quickly decided to 
follow the moral group norm, even when the strategy prescribed by the norm was in conflict 
with personal gains. This was different in the competence norm condition, where participants 
showed evidence of a decision delay (indicating a decisional dilemma) when the norm 
advocating group status improvement was in contrast with personal gains.  
A subsequent study (Ellemers et al., 2008, Study 2, N = 123) was designed to more 
directly compare the relative impact of morality vs. competence norms against each other. 
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Whereas participants in Study 1 either received information about what the group considered 
moral or about what the group considered competent, in this second study participants were 
simultaneously provided with information about the group’s evaluation of different status 
improvement strategies both in terms of morality and competence. Thus, in some conditions 
the group approved of a particular strategy as being both moral and competent, and 
disapproved the opposing strategy as being immoral and incompetent (while 
counterbalancing the content of approved behaviour as being either individual or collective 
status improvement). In other conditions, the morality and competence norms diverged in 
advocating opposite strategies for status improvement (e.g., when the group considered 
individual status improvement to be smart but immoral). This created a trade-off in which the 
decision to follow a particular strategy - because it was approved by the group as being moral 
– would at the same time imply going against what the group considered competent, or vice 
versa. If it is true that moral judgments represent the most powerful guideline for intragroup 
behavioural regulation, participants should follow the moral norm even when this decision 
implies that they will be considered less competent by their group.  
Results of this second study again showed that moral norms have a greater impact on 
the behaviour of individual group members than competence norms. Even though both types 
of norms influenced the behavioural decisions group members made, the effect of the moral 
norm was much stronger (partial eta squared = .40) than the effect of the competence norm 
(partial eta squared = .04). Moreover, participants’ decision latencies indicated that morality 
norms provoke less of a decisional dilemma than competence norms, in that participants 
quickly decided to go along with the moral norm, regardless of how this would reflect on 
their perceived competence. This further confirmed that people attach more importance to 
morality norms than to competence norms in making behavioural choices.  
 Results of a third study in this series (Ellemers et al., 2008; Study 3, N = 100), further 
confirmed these findings with a different methodology, examining members of a natural 
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group namely inhabitants of Southern Italy. Through a paper-and-pencil procedure, a sample 
of Southern Italians was asked to anonymously complete a questionnaire regarding 
employment in the South of Italy. Low ingroup status was induced by informing participants 
that a previous survey conducted by the National Institute for Statistics – comparing 
employment opportunities in different areas of Italy – had demonstrated that the economic 
situation was relatively unfavourable in the South of Italy. Subsequently, participants were 
informed that this prior survey had focused on two different ways in which people may deal 
with this difference in opportunities, namely by improving their personal position or by 
aiming to redress the disadvantageous employment conditions in the South more generally.  
Different group norms were then induced by indicating how other inhabitants from the South 
of Italy had evaluated these different strategies in a prior survey, in terms of morality and 
competence. For instance, participants were informed that personal position improvement 
was considered as smart, but also as immoral, or vice versa. Results of this study again 
confirmed that only the moral norm provided by the group affected participants’ choice of 
strategy, while evaluating a particular behaviour as being competent or incompetent had no 
significant effect on participants’ preferences for one strategy or the other.  
3.3 Moral norm adherence and intragroup respect 
 The studies reviewed in the previous section extend prior research that showed that 
moral judgments can be more important than competence ratings in the evaluation of others 
(e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), by showing that group members are more willing to 
comply with moral group norms than with norms otherwise framed. This suggests that it is 
also important for the self to be seen as moral by other members of an in-group. If this is 
indeed the case, adhering to moral norms should be considered the best way to be a ´good´ 
group member, as a way to ensure individual inclusion and centrality in the group. The 
validity of this reasoning was examined in a series of studies asking participants to indicate 
how they experienced being evaluated by other group members, depending on whether these 
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evaluations referred to their competence or their morality (Pagliaro, Ellemers, Barreto, & Di 
Cesare, in preparation). In these studies we asked participants to consider how other members 
of their group would think of them if they were to display moral or immoral behaviour 
(indicating honesty, sincerity or trustworthiness) or if they were to behave in ways indicating 
their (lack of) competence, intelligence or skill.  
The first study in this series (Study 1, N = 126) asked research participants to indicate 
for different evaluative judgments how pervasive they considered these to be, and to what 
extent each of these judgments would predict the respect received from other ingroup 
members. Results revealed that people consider moral evaluations by other ingroup members 
as more pervasive and as more consequential for the amount of respect they expect to receive 
from the ingroup. The second study (Study 2, N = 299) replicated these results and 
additionally revealed that participants thought that displays of immoral behaviour would be 
more consequential for their long term image in the group than displays of incompetent 
behaviour. A third study (Study 3a, N = 138) further revealed that participants were prepared 
to engage in more effort to repair and justify their immoral (compared to their moral) 
behaviour towards their own group of friends, while judgments of their incompetent vs. 
competent behaviours did not yield differential reparation efforts. A fourth study (Study 3b, 
N = 99) demonstrated that there was no similar evidence of increased motivation to repair 
and justify immoral behaviour when this behaviour was observed and evaluated by others 
outside the group of friends, who were not considered self-relevant. 
A further study (Study 4, N = 156), crossed the valence of ingroup judgments with the 
dimensions on which these judgments were made. This time, participants were asked to 
indicate how they would respond if their close friends would evaluate them positively or 
negatively in terms of their morality or competence. Results of this study again confirmed 
that moral judgments were seen as more pervasive than competence judgments. Furthermore, 
even though participants anticipated receiving more respect from the ingroup after a positive 
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than after a negative evaluation, this effect was more pronounced for judgments pertaining to 
their morality than for judgments of their competence. Due to the greater perceived 
pervasiveness, participants subsequently indicated a greater willingness to invest effort to 
justify and repair their behaviour when they had been evaluated in terms of morality rather 
than competence. A final study (Study 5, N = 321) further corroborated these effects, and 
additionally revealed that the anticipated level of intra-group respect relates to stress and 
coping appraisals which in turn explain the willingness of individuals to engage in attempts to 
repair their image as a moral group member. That is, we found that a negative moral 
evaluation stemming from the ingroup lowers the level of anticipated ingroup respect. A 
series of mediation analyses subsequently showed that as a consequence of this, individuals 
report experiencing higher levels of situation-related stress and at the same time indicate 
perceiving their abilities to cope with the situation to be decreased. Both the enhanced stress 
and the reduced coping appraisals in turn predicted the individual’s increased willingness to 
invest effort to justify and repair their behaviour.  
 Together these studies indicate that people are particularly concerned about appearing 
moral to other ingroup members, and are motivated to behave in ways that secure their 
standing in the group as a moral group member. If so, then this should have implications for 
the extent to which individuals adhere to group norms, as a function of whether or not these 
are perceived to be diagnostic of morality. Within groups, the pressure to be moral should be 
greater than the pressure to be competent, because the endorsement of diverging moral values 
in the group is experienced as more problematic for groups than diversity in competencies 
(Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harinck, & Scheepers, in press). This is due to the fact that moral 
issues tend to be seen as self-identifying, and non-negotiable (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997), 
causing lack of tolerance for those who adhere to different moral values (Skitka, Bauman, & 
Sargis, 2005; Turiel, 1983). Accordingly, interpersonal differences in moral values have been 
found to reduce the desire for social interaction (Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003; Wainryb, 
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Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001). As a result, deviance from moral values endorsed by the 
ingroup should be problematic for individual group members, who run the risk of 
jeopardizing their inclusion in the group. Conversely, compliance with shared moral values 
communicates that the individual is motivated to fit in and respects the behavioural 
guidelines proposed by other ingroup members (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). As a result, group 
members should anticipate that enacting moral norms provides a way to earn respect and 
acceptance from other ingroup members, while being aware that they might elicit social 
sanctions, in the forms of ridicule or ostracism when they transgress these norms (Fry, 2006; 
Sleebos, Ellemers, & de Gilder, 2006; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992; see also 
Tafarodi & Milne, 2002). 
This prior work led to the prediction that the effect of moral norms on the behaviour 
of individual group members is driven by the notion that this has more profound social 
identity implications than adherence to competence norms (Pagliaro et al., 2011; see also 
Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002; Schwartz, 1992). Two studies were conducted to test these 
predictions. Both were carried out among inhabitants of Southern Italy, and followed a design 
similar to the study by Ellemers et al. (2008, Study 3). The first study (Pagliaro et al., 2011, 
Study 1, N = 82) aimed to compare the effects of morality vs. competence based group norms 
on the behaviour of individual group members. Again, participants were first informed about 
the low status of their ingroup compared to inhabitants of Northern Italy, and provided with 
bogus results from a prior survey allegedly conveying morality and competence based group 
norms. However, this time participants were asked to indicate how they anticipated other 
members of their group to respond when they opted for the normative (vs. counter-normative) 
strategy, that is, when they behaved in line with what the group norm advocated. Specifically, 
participants estimated whether (counter-) normative behaviours would earn them respect 
from other ingroup members in terms of being included and valued as a group member 
(Sleebos et al., 2006; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Then, participants indicated 
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their willingness to invest effort in different strategies (i.e., individual and group status 
improvement strategies) that had allegedly been rated as normative or counter-normative by 
other members of their group.  
 Results of this study revealed that participants’ willingness to invest in a particular 
strategy only depended on whether or not it was described as the group’s moral norm (see 
Table 5). This was regardless of the specific status improvement strategy that was advocated 
by the group (individual or collective status improvement), and emerged on a variety 
measures that were used to assess their behavioural preferences. Furthermore, this effect of 
moral norms on the behaviour of individual group members’ behaviour was mediated by 
anticipated ingroup respect (see Figure 2). That is, both when the group norm prescribed 
individual status improvement and when the norm prescribed collective status improvement, 
participants anticipated being more included and more valued as a group member when 
opting for the strategy that was considered moral by other ingroup members, and this 
anticipation in turn determined their behavioural choices. This is in line with our reasoning 
that people attach more importance to moral rather than competence group norms due to the 
special role of morality for people’s social identities. The effectiveness of moral norms 
regardless of the strategy these prescribed allows for the exclusion of alternative explanations 
in terms of intra-group interdependence or instrumentality of cooperative behaviour in 
groups. Indeed, the fact that participants also went along with moral group norms that 
advocated individualistic behaviour indicates that such norms have a specific identity-
defining function for the group and its members, rather than just constituting a tool to 
suppress selfish behaviour.  
 A second study using this paradigm was conducted to provide further evidence that 
the tendency to behave in line with moral norms actually stems from group-based social 
identities, instead of reflecting a more generic desire for (moral) social approval (Pagliaro et 
al., 2011, Study 2, N = 69). This study compared the effect of moral norms stemming from 
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the ingroup with those stemming from a higher status outgroup. Thus, a sample of Southern 
Italians were simultaneously presented with information allegedly conveying ingroup (South 
of Italy) as well as outgroup (North of Italy) norms, with both groups either advocating the 
same strategy or ingroup and outgroup norms stating opposing preferences, depending on 
experimental conditions. Again anticipated ingroup respect and participants’ own choice of a 
strategy to improve their social standing were assessed.  
 The results from this study revealed that the decisive factor in the effectiveness of 
moral norms is the consensus within the ingroup about what is morally appropriate. That is, 
participants in this study responded to ingroup norms in the same way as in Study 1. Again, 
moral ingroup norms influenced group members’ behavioural choices because participants 
saw this as a way to earn respect from other ingroup members. However, no comparable 
effects were observed when identical moral norms were communicated by the outgroup. This 
further illustrates that the tendency to follow moral norms relates to participants’ social 
identity concerns, rather than reflecting a more general desire to be positively evaluated in 
moral domains, and underlines the significance of distinct group identities and the importance 
of ingroup respect in this process. 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 In this review we have considered the implications of moral judgments within groups 
for the behavioural regulation of individual group members. This complements existing 
approaches that either address individual-level moral decision making, or consider how 
people respond when they are asked to consider the possibility that their group has behaved 
immorally. The social identity approach we have proposed here makes clear that – in addition 
to generic and universal moral norms – specific behavioural guidelines may be elevated to the 
level of moral group standards that come to define how the group is different from other 
groups, and prescribe what is the ‘right’ way for group members to behave. In support of this 
Morality and Groups  
 
35
 
analysis, we have reviewed results from a recent program of research, revealing the 
importance of morality for group identification and pride, which in turn impacts on the 
willingness of individual group members to adhere to moral group norms. 
 When considering the social implications of morality, we highlighted how morality is 
identity defining (Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012). People prefer to identify with moral (vs. 
competent or sociable) groups, and they are more proud to belong to such groups (Leach et 
al., 2007). This is also the case in organizational contexts where perceptions of organizational 
morality elicit pride in the organization which, in turn, determine organizational commitment 
and employee work satisfaction (Ellemers et al., 2011). Accordingly, the perceived morality 
of an organization is more important than its perceived competence in predicting the 
likelihood that individual employees display job satisfaction and are willing to comply with 
organizational rules and regulations (Ellemers & Boezeman, under review). Given that group 
leaders are preferred when they embody core group values (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 
2011), leadership endorsement also relies on perceived leader morality, and more so than on 
perceived leader competence. In addition, when team members believe their leader is 
prototypical of the group, they assume the leader is moral, rather than immoral, 
demonstrating the close relation between perceived leader morality and prototypicality 
(Barreto et al., 2012). 
 These results demonstrate the fundamental role of morality in defining who we are 
and where we belong. The more individuals psychologically identify with and value the 
ingroup, the more they should be motivated to show they are “good” group members. As a 
consequence, since morality is central to group’s distinct identity, an important way to 
acquire respect within the group is to behave in a manner that the ingroup defines as morally 
right.  Further consideration of this group dynamic function of morality allows for the 
examination of the role of morality on the intra-group regulation processes as a source of 
group influence which affects behavioural regulation within groups (see also Aquino & Reed, 
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2002). In line with the reasoning we propose, the research discussed in this review 
consistently shows that people are particularly concerned about the group’s evaluation of 
their morality rather than about the group’s evaluations of their competence and are more 
motivated to behave in ways that demonstrate their morality to the ingroup (Pagliaro et al., in 
preparation). As a result of this process, individual group members are more likely to adhere 
to group norms when such norms are seen to convey the moral (vs. competence) evaluations 
of other ingroup members (Ellemers et al., 2008; Pagliaro et al., 2011). The effect of moral 
norms on individuals’ behaviour is guided by the anticipation that pro-normative behaviour 
allows individuals to earn respect from other ingroup members (Pagliaro et al., 2011). An 
important consequence of this process is that the impact of moral group norms occurs 
regardless of the specific (e.g., individualistic vs. collectivistic) behaviour prescribed by the 
norm. This allows us to understand that people sometimes persist in behaving in ways that 
may be considered as immoral, due to group pressure. As long as the moral norms of the 
group condone or prescribe such behaviour individuals will be motivated to display acts that 
can earn them respect as a ‘good’ and ‘proper’ group member. In this context, it is also 
noteworthy that individuals do not adapt their behavioural choices to moral norms when these 
are conveyed by others who are not seen as relevant to the self (e.g. outgroup members). This 
last result reminds us that there is scope in going beyond a theorization of morality as a 
generic tendency to suppress selfish behaviour. Indeed, it highlights the added value of 
considering the group-dynamic and social identity implications of group-specific  moral 
judgments that help understand the role of morality and moral judgments for the regulation of 
individual behaviour in group contexts.   
 This approach to morality emphasizing intra-group dynamics aims at complementing 
previous understandings of morality, as well as raising new and intriguing questions. 
Considering specific social-regulatory functions of morality seems an important starting point 
to develop new directions for future research. For instance, now that we have determined that 
Morality and Groups  
 
37
 
morality helps individuals to define who they are and the groups or organizations they want 
to belong to, it would be interesting to investigate the reverse process. That is, future research 
might reveal specific circumstances under which individuals are prone to define themselves 
in terms of shared moral values, and examine how they respond to other ingroup or outgroup 
members who either challenge or validate their morality. Moreover, given the centrality of 
morality for people’s sense of self and social identity, it would be of interest to investigate 
whether and how people invoke claims of superior ingroup morality as a collective strategy to 
improve or maintain a positive social identity.  
 Further consideration of the group-dynamic function of moral judgments also raises 
additional questions of interest. For instance, it seems useful to reconsider some well-
established phenomena in the light of the recent findings reviewed here. Although there is 
abundant evidence in the literature attesting to the impact of social norms on individual 
behavioural choices, we have shown in this review that adherence to norms that have 
implications for one’s perceived morality is more pronounced than adherence to norms that 
are consequential for one’s perceived competence. Would the dimension of evaluation also 
moderate the management of deviance either by helping group members improve their 
behaviour or by excluding them from the group? The present work suggests that counter-
normative behaviour should elicit more severe sanctions when this implies a moral violation. 
Thus, future research might establish whether a deviant ingroup member would be more 
likely to be punished whether he/she transgresses a moral dictate than when a different type 
of transgression takes place. However, it may also be that the perceived severity of the 
transgression in itself is already stronger when it occurs in a domain defined as moral. These 
and related questions might be pursued in future research. 
 In sum, additional questions remain, and future research can further advance our 
comprehension of the dynamics of morality. Nevertheless, the present review convincingly 
shows that considering the role of intra-group dynamics and group-based identities 
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contributes to a better understanding of the importance of moral judgments. Indeed, 
considering morality in terms of its social functions, instead of focusing exclusively on the 
implications of specific moral guidelines for individual decision making, provides a new and 
exciting perspective on this important area of research.  
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Table 1: School teachers’ mean emotional responses and behavioral approach intentions 
towards a new principal described in terms of morality (high vs. low) and competence (high 
vs. low). Standard deviations are provided within brackets (Pagliaro et al., in press; N = 79)
 
                  
        Emotional Responses          Cooperative Intentions  
 
Morality 
High  5.84 (0.87)            5.29 (1.17)     
Low     4.30 (1.33)           3.60 (1.34)   
 
 
 Note: 0 (not at all) – 7 (very much).  
(Source: Pagliaro, S., Brambilla, M., Sacchi, S., D'Angelo, M., & Ellemers, N. (in press). 
Initial impressions determine behaviours: Morality predicts the willingness to help 
newcomers. Journal of Business Ethics. DOI: 10.1007/s10551-012-1508-y. Reprinted with 
permission from Springer Science+Business Media B.V.) 
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Table 2: Implicit bias (IAT D-scores) towards women with or without headscarves, 
depending on whether the IAT is presented as indicating participant’s morality or 
competence. Lower D-scores indicate less implicit bias. Standard deviations are 
provided within brackets (adapted from Van Nunspeet, F., Ellemers, N., Derks, B.,  & 
Nieuwenhuis, S. (in press). Moral concerns increase attention and response 
monitoring during IAT performance: ERP evidence. Social, Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience. doi: 10.1093/scan/nss118). 
 
 
                  
        Study 1 (N = 66)            Study 2 (N = 44)  
 
Test of morality    .13 (.43)              .13 (.40)     
Test of competence      .34 (.36)              .42 (.36)   
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Table 3: Group pride and perceived ingroup variability reported by students of Leiden 
University as a function of manipulations of the morality (high vs. low) and 
competence (high vs. low) of the university (Study 4; N = 96), or the morality (high 
vs. low) and sociability (high vs. low) of the university (Study 5; N = 87). Standard 
deviations are provided within brackets (Adapted from: Leach, C. W., Ellemers, N., & 
Barreto, M. (2007). Group virtue: The importance of morality (vs. competence and 
sociability) in the positive evaluation of in-groups. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 93, 234-249). 
 
                  
         Group Pride            Ingroup Variability  
 
Study 4 
Morality  High  4.76 (1.18)               3.85 (1.29)     
Low     4.39 (1.15)              3.52 (1.49)   
 
Study 5    Group Pride  Similarity of self to ingroup 
Morality  High  5.16 (0.80)               4.34 (1.37)     
Low     4.73 (0.86)              3.85 (1.44)   
 
Note: 0 (not at all) – 7 (very much).  
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Table 4: Choice of status improvement strategies (work for group vs. self) and decision 
latencies as function of ingroup norms labeling group status improvement as moral vs. 
competent (Study 1; N = 89); and as a function of moral norms (moral approval vs. 
disapproval) compared to competence norms (competence approval vs. disapproval) 
in experimental (Study 2; N = 123) and natural (Study 3; N = 100) groups. Standard 
deviations are provided within brackets (Adapted from: Ellemers, N., Pagliaro, S., 
Barreto, M., & Leach, C.W. (2008). Is it better to be moral than smart? The effects of 
morality and competence norms on the decision to work at group status improvement. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1397-1410). 
 
Study 1   Choice to work for groupa    Response Latency (in sec) 
Moral Norm   3.71 (1.31)               4.22 (1.96)     
Competence Norm  2.45 (1.95)              5.16 (2.75)   
Study 2   Choice to work for groupa     Response Latency (in sec) 
Approval Disapproval      Approval     Disapproval  
Moral Norm  3.28 (1.40)  1.13 (0.67)      3.88 (1.87)       4.05 (1.83)         
Competence Norm      2.50 (1.70)  1.96 (1.63)      4.07 (1.74)       3.87 (1.96)  
Study 3   Choice to work for groupb     
Approval Disapproval        
Moral Norm  6.76 (1.71)  5.89 (2.39)        
Competence Norm      6.02 (2.22)  6.61 (2.00)       
 
Note: a 0 (always individual status improvement) – 5 (always group status improvement).  
 b 0 (absolutely not) – 5 (absolutely). 
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Table 5: Norm adherence and anticipated ingroup respect as a function of ingroup norms 
conveying moral approval vs. disapproval compared to competence approval vs. disapproval 
(Study 1; N = 82), or compared to outgroup norms indicating moral approval vs. disapproval 
(Study 2; N = 69). Standard deviations are provided within brackets (Pagliaro et al., 2011).
 
Study 1         Ingroup Norm 
     Moral Approval  Moral Disapproval 
Norm Adherence       6.98 (1.59)               4.86 (2.19)     
Anticipated Ingroup Respect       6.05 (2.17)              3.29 (1.81)   
 
Study 2 
Norm Adherence       7.46 (1.06)               6.12 (1.76)     
Anticipated Ingroup Respect       6.98 (1.39)              2.71 (1.12)   
 
Note: 1 (absolutely not) – 9 (absolutely). 
(Source: Pagliaro, S., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2011). Sharing moral values: Anticipated 
in-group respect as a determinant of adherence to morality-based (but not competence-based) 
group norms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1117-1129. by <<SAGE 
Publications Ltd.>>/<<SAGE Publications, Inc.>>, All rights reserved. © 2011) 
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Figure 1. The effect of perceived organizational morality, through pride in the organization, 
on affective commitment and work satisfaction of organizational employees. Results of 
Structural Equation Modeling (Ellemers et al., 2011, Study 1; N = 126) 
 
Note: ***p < .001 (Fit indices: χ2 = 80.67, N = 126, df = 41; NNFI = .95; CFI = 96; RMSEA 
= .09; AIC = -1.34).)  
(Reprinted from: Journal of Organizational Moral Psychology, 1. Corporate Social 
Responsibility as a source of organizational morality, employee commitment and satisfaction, 
97-124; copyright (2011). Ellemers, N., Kingma, L., Van den Burgt, J., & Barreto, M.) 
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Figure 2. Anticipated Ingroup Respect mediates the effect of moral ingroup norms on 
willingness to invest in (collective and individual) strategies for status improvement (Pagliaro 
et al., 2011, Study 1; N = 82). 
 
 
     Collective Strategies 
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                                                                   .49***/.19 
 
 
 
 
 
      Individual Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
                   .57***                                                                                          -.49***/.42*** 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   -.35***/.11  
 
Note: ***p < .001; similar patterns emerged in Study 2 (N = 69) 
 
  
 
(Source: Pagliaro, S., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2011). Sharing moral values: Anticipated 
in-group respect as a determinant of adherence to morality-based (but not competence-based) 
group norms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1117-1129. by <<SAGE 
Publications Ltd.>>/<<SAGE Publications, Inc.>>, All rights reserved. © 2011) 
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